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1  | INTRODUC TION
Shared freshwater resources affect the health and wealth of millions 
around the world. Adequate quantities and qualities of water con-
tribute positively to the economic, environmental and social welfare 
of human and environmental populations within and beyond na-
tional borders. Despite the clear need for effective transboundary 
water cooperation, and the abundance of rules and State practice in 
this field, this goal remains elusive. Why is this, and how might it be 
addressed? Could international law provide fresh insights into why 
riparian nations fall short of successful transboundary water cooper-
ation? With a view to exploring these questions more fully, this arti-
cle selects China as a case study. The country is particularly relevant 
given its abundance of transboundary water basins and dearth of 
transboundary water agreements. China’s ‘upstream dilemma’1 pits 
the considerable national development imperatives of the world’s 
most populated country against a significant and vast array of down-
stream interests on river systems serving more than 40% of the 
global population.2
Some of the greatest rivers in the world originate in China – 
the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong, 
Yellow and Yangtze.3 Many of these suffer from compromised 
water security and degraded ecosystems.4 China and its burgeon-
ing population (over 1.4 billion) share diminishing freshwater re-
sources5 with 14 riparian nations – Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam.6 The transbound-
 1The notion of the ‘upstream dilemma’ is discussed in P Wouters, H Chen and JE Nickum, 
Transboundary Water Cooperation Principles, Practice and Prospects for China and its 
Neighbours (Routledge 2018). See also JL Turner et al, ‘China's Upstream Advantage in 
the Great Himalayan Watershed’ (2013) 16 Asia Policy 11.
 2Statistics Times, ‘List of Asian Countries by Population’ <http://stati stics times.com/
demog raphi cs/asian -count ries-by-popul ation.php>.
 3China Water Risk, ‘Geopolitical Risks: Transboundary Rivers’ (9 February 2012) <http://
www.china water risk.org/resou rces/analy sis-revie ws/geopo litic al-risks -trans bound 
ary-river s/>.
 4Y Feng, D He and W Wang, ‘Identifying China’s Transboundary Water Risks and 
Vulnerabilities – A Multidisciplinary Analysis Using Hydrological Data and Legal/
Institutional Settings’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 146.
 5China Water Risk, ‘No Water, No Growth – Does Asia Have Enough Water to Develop?’ 
(21 September 2018) <http://www.china water risk.org/resou rces/analy sis-revie ws/
no-water -no-growt h-does-asia-have-enoug h-water -to-devel op/>. See also summary of 
China’s domestic and international freshwaters in: R Kinna and A Rieu-Clarke, The 
Governance Regime of the Mekong River Basin: Can the Global Water Conventions Strengthen 
the 1995 Mekong Agreement? (Brill 2017) 8–13; H Zhang and M Li, ‘Thirsty China and its 
Transboundary Waters’ in H Zhang and M Li (eds), China and Transboundary Water Politics 
in Asia (Routledge 2018) 3, 3 and 5.
 6Y Su, ‘China’s International Water Relations’ in S McCaffrey, C Leb and RT Denoon (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Water Law (Edward Elgar 2019) 447; JE Nickum, ‘The 
Upstream Superpower: China’s International Rivers’ in O Varis, AK Biswas and C 
Tortajada (eds), Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes (Springer 2008) 227. See 
also C Du and H Zhong, ‘Study on Transboundary Water Issues in China’ in 2011 
International Symposium on Water Resource and Environmental Protection (Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2011) 40.
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Can international law provide new insights for better understanding transboundary 
water practice? Selecting China as one of the most challenging case studies, the article 
explores the possible elements of a reconceptualized approach to international freshwa-
ter management. This study demonstrates how the legal discourse surrounding regional 
transboundary waters can be reframed using the concept of contextualized international 
law to offer increased opportunities for improved transboundary water cooperation.
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ary basins reach into three more countries – Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and Thailand.7 Most of Asia relies on freshwater re-
sources flowing from China. Less than 1% percent of China’s na-
tional water comes from outside of its borders, while it contributes 
significantly to river basins originating in its territory.8 Nine prov-
inces and autonomous regions9 across the country are located 
within transboundary watersheds, which include a vast array of 
contiguous and successive rivers, lakes and aquifers with diverse 
geophysical qualities.10
Water-related pressures within China are compounded by 
quantity and quality issues; 11 of China’s 31 provinces suffer from 
water scarcity,11 with adverse impacts on human and environmen-
tal welfare.12 Some 28,000 waterways have vanished from China’s 
map.13 Efforts to tackle over-use and severe pollution were intro-
duced in the ‘Red Lines’ approach detailed in China’s 12th Five-
Year Plan (FYP) – ‘one of the most important documents on the 
planet’ for global sustainability.14 The Red-Line approach requires 
ongoing monitoring across three key areas – water use, water-use 
efficiency and pollution.15 In the current 13th FYP, China contin-
ues to address these issues, with an increased focus on tackling 
pollution.16 While some progress has been made through the na-
tional implementation of the FYPs,17 China’s water problems18 
threaten to be exacerbated by its continued economic development 
and the emerging climate crisis.19 At the transboundary level, China’s 
‘upstream dilemma’ complicates things even more.20 The main chal-
lenge in this context is how to meet growing demand within China 
while taking into account the needs of downstream neighbours?21 
Key issues relate primarily to China’s continued (mostly unilateral) 
dam building,22 which its southern riparian neighbours claim has 
compromised the quality and quantity of flow, adversely affecting 
human and environmental populations downstream.23 Without 
transboundary water agreements on most of its shared freshwater 
resources, China’s development actions upstream continue to be 
called into question.24
Following this summary of China’s transboundary waters and key 
challenges, the next part summarizes the rules of international law 
that govern transboundary freshwater,25 as the context for examin-
 7H Chen, A Rieu-Clarke and P Wouters, ‘Exploring China’s Transboundary Water Treaty 
Practice through the Prism of the UN Watercourse Convention’ (2013) 38 Water 
International 217. See also S Moore, ‘Water Resource Issues, Policy and Politics in China’ 
(Brookings Institution 2013). China has the world’s fifth-largest national endowment of 
fresh water, but its 2000 cubic metre/person/year falls far below the global average of 
about 6200 cubic metre/person/year.
 8Y He, ‘China’s Practice on the Non-navigational Uses of Transboundary Waters: 
Transforming Diplomacy through Rules of International Law’ (2015) 40 Water 
International 312.
 9These provinces and autonomous regions include Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Inner 
Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan.
 10China shares some eight major transboundary aquifers, including a major aquifer 
between China and Russia. See H Zaisheng et al, ‘Review on Transboundary Aquifers in 
People’s Republic of China with Case Study of Heilongjiang-Amur River Basin’ (2008) 54 
Environmental Geology 1411.
 11China Water Risk (n 5).
 12C Yu, ‘China’s Water Crisis Needs More than Words’ (2011) 470 Nature 307; J Qui, 
‘China Faces up to Groundwater Crisis’ (2010) 466 Nature 308.
 13‘28,000 Chinese Waterways Dry up amid Pollution Tidal Wave’ (RT News, 30 March 
2013). This article indicates that ‘the number of rivers in China with catchment areas of 
over 100 square kilometers has halved compared to 60 years ago’.
 14D Pamlin, ‘Beijing’s Plan Shows Path to the Future’ (China Daily, 29 April 2016) 
<https://www.china daily.com.cn/a/20160 4/29/WS5a2 b6fd4 a310e efe3e 9a021a.html>.
 15China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) <http://cbi.typep ad.com/china_direc 
t/2011/05/china s-twelf th-five-new-plan-the-full-engli sh-versi on.html> requires 
monitoring across three ‘red lines’ related to total water use, water use efficiency and for 
controlling pollution, with limits on each of these set for 2015, 2020 and 2030; See 
Global Water Partnership, ‘China’s Water Resources Management Challenge: The “Three 
Red Lines”’ (2015) <https://www.gwp.org/globa lasse ts/globa l/toolb ox/publi catio ns/
techn ical-focus -paper s/tfpch ina_2015.pdf>. See also K Sun and J Chen, ‘Evaluation 
Index Quantification for “The Three Red Lines” of Water Resources Management’ (2011) 
28 Journal of Yangtze River Scientific Research Institute 5 (explaining that ‘the Three 
Red Lines’, at the core of the ‘most stringent water resources management policy’ 
comprise three red lines restricting water resources exploitation and utilization; 
controlling water consumption efficiency; and limiting water resources pollution; and 
that implementation of each red line requires a corresponding quantified evaluation 
index).
 16China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) <https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/polic yrele 
ase_8233/20161 2/P0201 91101 48224 28503 25.pdf> builds on past FYPs and includes 
25 targets aimed at addressing China’s unsustainable growth, including water-related 
actions. See also D Seligsohn and A Hsu, ‘How China’s 13th Five-Year Plan Addresses 
Energy and the Environment’ (10 March 2016) <http://www.china file.com/repor 
ting-opini on/envir onmen t/how-china s-13th-five-year-plan-addre sses-energ y-and-envir 
onment>; China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (covering 2021–2025) is a current work in 
progress, including sustainable development objectives; see <http://engli sh.www.gov.
cn/premi er/news/20191 1/26/conte nt_WS5dd d1626 c6d0b cf8c4 c17d87.html>; and I 
Neuweg and N Stern, ‘China’s 14th Plan, Sustainable Development and the New Era’ 
(2019) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Grant hamIn stitu te/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2019/05/China 
s-14th-plan-susta inabl e-devel opmen t-and-the-new-era.pdf>.
 17J Wang, ‘Managing China’s Water Stress Drop by Drop, China Water Risk’ (14 June 
2018) <http://www.china water risk.org/opini ons/manag ing-china s-water -stres 
s-drop-by-drop/>, looking at data from 2010 and 2015, concludes that China has begun 
to see the positive impacts of these strict measures, albeit with regional differences.
 18Y Feng and D He, ‘Transboundary Water Vulnerability and Its Drivers in China’ (2009) 
19 Journal of Geographical Sciences 189.
 19United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres refers to the ‘climate crisis’ 
as a ‘direct existential threat’; see D Carrington, ‘Why the Guardian is Changing the 
Language It Uses about the Environment’ (The Guardian, 17 May 2019).
 20Feng et al (n 4).
 21M Kattelus et al, ‘China’s Southbound Transboundary River Basins: A Case of 
Asymmetry’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 248.
 22D He et al, ‘China’s Transboundary Waters: New Paradigms for Water and Ecological 
Security through Applied Ecology’ (2014) 51 Journal of Applied Ecology 1159, at 1161 
(discussing China’s considerable dam building).
 23Kattelus et al (n 21) 248 (noting that six major transboundary river basins that drain 
south from China – the Red River, Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna and Indus – serve more than one billion people across Asia in areas with 
exceptional biodiversity.
 24DJ Devlaeminck, P Wouters and Y Liu, ‘List of China's Transboundary Water 
Agreements and Related Documents’ (20 January 2020) <https://david jdevl aemin 
ck.com/resea rch-resou rces/>.
 25On international water law generally, see S McCaffrey, The Law of International 
Watercourses (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2019); EB Weiss, International Law for a 
Water-Scarce World (Martinus Nijhoff 2013); A Rieu-Clarke, A Allan and S Hendry, 
Handbook on Water Law and Policy (Routledge 2016); CB Bourne, ‘The International Law 
Association’s Contribution to International Water Resources Law’ in P Wouters (ed), 
International Water Law, Selected Writings of Professor Charles B. Bourne (Kluwer Law 
International 1997) 233.
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ing China’s State practice in this field.26 Having established gaps in 
this practice, the article then moves to exploring China’s approach to 
international law considered more broadly. This reveals the contin-
ued importance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence27 as 
the bedrock of China’s foreign policy and international relations. The 
final sections draw together the main themes and propose a recon-
ceptualized approach to understanding and implementing trans-
boundary water cooperation, based on the China case study. 
International law concepts such as an ‘instrumentalist approach’, 
‘outcome cooperation’, ‘relational contracts’ and even ‘particular 
custom’ combine to provide the basis for a reframing of the legal 
discourse in this field. The multi-level analytical approach used here 
offers new opportunities to explore more closely some of the im-
portant factors that influence the type and quality of transboundary 
water cooperation. A more informed understanding of the ‘why’ of 
international cooperation through a riparian nation's perception of 
international law could help to inform the ‘how’ of effective trans-
boundary water cooperation. Reframing the legal discourse in this 
way could assist also with designing pragmatic steps towards ad-
dressing shared ‘hard’ transboundary water challenges.28
2  | INTERNATIONAL WATER L AW AND 
CHINA’S PR AC TICE
The rules of international law that govern the uses of transboundary 
water resources have been codified and progressively developed in 
two global instruments – the 1997 Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses 
Convention),29 and the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water 
Convention).30 These two multilateral agreements have emerged as a 
result of major in-depth studies and extensive examination of State 
practice in this field by the relevant United Nations (UN) bodies and 
experts, riparian nations’ feedback and academic debate, dating back 
to the 1800s.31 The two UN water conventions provide complemen-
tary frameworks for guiding States’ actions related to transboundary 
water utilization and management.32 The Water Convention, con-
cluded decades ago within a European context (primarily to address 
pollution issues and to limit adverse transboundary impact) provides a 
rather regulated regime, perhaps making it somewhat less easily 
transferable to an Asian context.33 However, China’s transboundary 
water practice, examined primarily in the context of the Watercourses 
Convention, reveals broad alignment with the key principles of both 
instruments. Despite this, there are differences, briefly summarized 
here.
China, in the preponderance of its water treaties, expressly rec-
ognizes the overarching customary rule of ‘equitable and reasonable 
use’ of transboundary waters.34 China’s statements and voting re-
cords in the course of the negotiation of the Watercourses 
Convention highlight its support for this fundamental norm.35 The 
open-ended nature of the rule of equitable and reasonable use (de-
liberately drafted in this non-prescriptive way, after much debate) is 
considered a particular strength. Its final formulation in the 
Watercourses Convention provides a malleable standard, devised 
for, and capable of, dealing with the (inevitable) changing circum-
stances of transboundary water resources.36 By way of comparison, 
agreements setting forth fixed parameters for water-sharing may 
lead to problems with compliance, unless flexibility is built in, 
through procedural rules and institutional mechanisms capable of 
 26On China’s transboundary waters and international law, see P Wouters, ‘International 
Law of Watercourses: New Dimensions’ in Collected Courses of the Xiamen Academy of 
International Law, Volume 3 (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 347. For an overview of the historical 
context on this topic in Asia, see E Benvenisti, ‘Asian Traditions and Contemporary 
International Law on the Management of Natural Resources’ (2008) 7 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 273.
 27See generally: H Xue, ‘Chinese Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and 
International Law’ (2011) 355 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law 41; also B Saul, ‘China, Natural Resources, Sovereignty and International Law’ (2013) 
37 Asian Studies Review 196.
 28‘Hard’ challenges in this context refer to the increased competition for shared uses of 
diminishing quantities and qualities of transboundary freshwater in the wake of climate 
change, growing populations and degraded ecosystems. See AD Tarlock, ‘Four 
Challenges for International Water Law’ (2010) 23 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 
369 (Tarlock, ‘Four Challenges’); Tarlock identifies shortcomings in this field – scarcity, 
unilateral action, climate change, environmental degradation, and social inequity – and 
suggests that a combined approach of benefit-sharing and integrated management could 
contribute to ‘fairer, open, environmentally sustainable, cooperative, and adaptive 
management regimes among riparian states’ (ibid 371). See also his recent views in AD 
Tarlock, ‘Toward a More Robust International Water Law of Cooperation to Address 
Droughts and Ecosystem Conservation’ (2016) 28 Georgetown Environmental Law 
Review 261, 262 (Tarlock, ‘Toward a More Robust International Water Law’).
 29Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(adopted 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 August 2014) 1997 36 ILM 700 
(Watercourses Convention).
 30Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes (adopted 17 
March 1992, entered into force 6 October 1996) 1936 UNTS 269 (Water Convention).
 31See McCaffrey et al (n 6) xxiii–xli.
 32S McCaffrey, ‘The 1997 UN Convention: Compatibility and Complementarity’ in A 
Tanzi et al (eds), The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (Brill 2015) 49; A Tanzi, ‘The Economic Commission 
for Europe Water Convention and the United Nations Watercourses Convention: An 
Analysis of their Harmonized Contribution to International Water Law’ UN Doc ECE/
MP.WAT/42 (2015).
 33P Wouters and H Chen, ‘China’s “Soft-Path” to Transboundary Water Cooperation 
Examined in the Light of Two Global UN Water Conventions – Exploring the ‘Chinese 
Way’ (2013) 22 Journal of Water Law 232; Y Su, ‘Contemporary Legal Analysis of China’s 
Transboundary Water Regimes: International Law in Practice’ (2013) 39 Water 
International 705.
 34P Wouters, ‘The Yin and Yang of International Water Law: China's Transboundary 
Water Practice and the Changing Contours of Sovereignty’ (2014) 23 Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 67.
 35UNGA ‘99th Plenary Meeting, Fifty-First Session’ UN Doc A/51/PV.99 (21 May 1997); 
see Chen et al (n 7); Su (n 33); Wouters (n 26); P Wouters, ‘Enhancing China’s 
Transboundary Water Cooperation – What Role for the UNECE Water Convention?’ in 
Tanzi et al (n 32) 451.
 36E Benvenisti, ‘Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges 
of International Water Resources Law’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 
384, 402–404. Benvenisti highlights the important role of ‘vague’ rules in difficult 
negotiations, including with future-proofing the legal regime.
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adjusting established regimes in the event of changing 
circumstances.37
Considered within the context of the core substantive rules in 
this field reflected in the UN water conventions and in customary 
law – the duties to cooperate, to use transboundary waters in an 
equitable and reasonable manner, to take due diligence to not cause 
significant harm, to protect the environment of the watercourse38 – 
China’s treaty practice reveals rather patchy and imprecise adher-
ence to these specific obligations.39 Most of China’s transboundary 
water agreements (concluded primarily with its northern and west-
ern neighbours) are quite general, with cooperation effected in large 
part by joint bodies. With regard to procedural duties, the detailed 
provisions of the two UN water conventions are not reflected in 
China’s diverse transboundary water treaty practice, which ranges 
from limited agreements on data exchange to more comprehensive 
arrangements establishing joint institutions.40 The most functional 
arrangements appear to be between China and its northern neigh-
bours Russia, Mongolia and Kazakhstan.41 Transboundary water co-
operation with China’s southern neighbours, mostly limited to data 
exchange arrangements, appears to be evolving incrementally under 
the newly established basin-wide Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 
Mechanism.42 In all other basins, China deals on a bilateral coun-
try-to-country basis.43
China’s approach to dispute settlement in its water-related 
agreements is significantly more restrained when compared with the 
provisions set forth in the two UN water conventions.44 China’s 
view, aligned with its firm embrace of the fundamental tenet of State 
sovereignty, rejects the notion that a framework convention should 
contain compulsory dispute settlement provisions;45 instead, it is for 
each nation to consent to dispute settlement procedures on a case-
by-case basis.46 It is a view shared by most countries, including the 
United States, and all Permanent Members of the UN Security 
Council, apart from the United Kingdom, the only member to accept 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.47 
China has traditionally relied on consultations and negotiations to 
address any inter-State disagreements, including with respect to its 
shared uses of transboundary waters.48 This approach is consistent 
across its treaty practice,49 and continues in China’s ongoing trans-
boundary water relations.50
In summary, while China’s treaty practice relating to transbound-
ary waters aligns broadly with the overarching rules of the 
Watercourses Convention, there are differences and notable 
trends.51 As China’s ‘upstream dilemma’ persists, and its continuing 
hydropower development in the upper reaches of transboundary 
watercourses remains controversial,52 how might international law 
offer new insights into China’s evolving transboundary water 
practice?
 37P Wouters, ‘Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving International Water 
Disputes: What Lessons Learned from State Practice?’ in International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), Resolution of International Water Disputes: Papers 
Emanating from the Sixth PCA International Law Seminar, November 8, 2002 (Kluwer Law 
2003) 111.
 38P Wouters et al, ‘Sharing Transboundary Waters – An Integrated Assessment of 
Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model’ (UNESCO IHP 2006) <https://
unesd oc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ pf000 0139794>.
 39Su (n 33).
 40Chen et al (n 7).
 41S Vinogradov and P Wouters, ‘Transboundary Water Cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and the Neighbouring States: Legal and Institutional Frameworks’ in 
McCaffrey et al (n 6) 463.
 42‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation’ (LMC) <http://www.lmcch ina.org/eng/>. The LMC, 
launched in March 2016, comprises six countries: China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam. The Fifth Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
was held in Vientiane, Laos on 20 February 2020. See also S Biba, China’s Hydro-politics in 
the Mekong: Conflict and Cooperation in Light of Securitization Theory (Routledge 2018).
 43Chen et al (n 7).
 44Wouters (n 37). Each of the UN water conventions provides for compulsory dispute 
settlement, although through different processes. The Watercourses Convention (n 29) sets 
forth a menu of settlement procedures (Article 33, with 10 sub-provisions and an annex), 
which include among other means an innovative mechanism – compulsory fact-finding 
(resorted to where other traditional procedures have been unsuccessful). The Water 
Convention (n 30) takes a similar but less elaborate approach to dispute settlement: the parties 
must seek a solution by negotiation or by any other means of dispute settlement acceptable to 
them (Article 22 and Annex). Where a dispute is not resolved under this provision the dispute 
may be settled by arbitration or submitted to the International Court of Justice.
 45The Chinese position: ‘Article 33 of the United Nations Charter lays down that States 
may seek a peaceful solution to a dispute by means of their own choice. The compulsory 
fact-finding dictated by the draft Convention goes against the provisions of the Charter. 
The Chinese Government favours the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, 
through consultations. We are not against fact-finding as an optional means of 
settlement, but we cannot agree to any mandatory means or procedures for the 
settlement of a dispute without the consent of the countries parties to the dispute’. See 
UNGA (n 35) 7. Other States challenged the compulsory dispute settlement provisions 
revealed during the voting in the UN Working Group of the Whole on the draft provision 
Article 33. China, Colombia, France, India and Turkey voted against the provision; see UN 
Working Group of the Whole Record, UN Doc A/C.6/51/NUW/L.4/Add1 (4 April 1997); 
see also remarks by France, India, Israel and Rwanda during the final voting on the UN 
Convention, UNGA (n 35) 8–11.
 46China continues to be a strong supporter of the UN Charter, including its provision on 
dispute settlement, Article 2(3), which provides: ‘All Members shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered’. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 
June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
 47PC Chan, China, State Sovereignty and International Legal Order (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 100. 
It is also notable that only 8% of Asian States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice, compared with 30% of European States, 39% of 
Latin American States and 41% of African States; see AR Darmawan, ‘International Law 
Takes a Step towards Asia’ (The Interpreter, 30 June 2020) <https://www.lowyi nstit ute.
org/the-inter prete r/inter natio nal-law-takes -step-towar ds-asia>.
 48J Pan, Towards a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China’s Territorial and 
Boundary Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 80.
 49Wouters and Chen (n 33).
 50China’s President Xi had proposed a five-point formula under which both countries 
would accommodate each other’s concerns in matters of ‘core interests’. See ‘PM Wants 
India-China Body on Brahmaputra Dams’ (Hindustan Times, 29 March 2013).
 51Wouters et al (n 1) 353 conclude that China’s transboundary water practice shows 
signs of incremental cooperation.
 52See generally B Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University 
Press 2011); S Ho, ‘China’s Transboundary River Policies Towards Kazakhstan: 
Issue-Linkages and Incentives for Cooperation’ (2017) 42 Water International 148; L 
Phan, ‘The Sambor Dam: How China's Breach of Customary International Law Will Affect 
the Future of the Mekong River Basin’ (2019) 32 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 105.
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3  | INTERNATIONAL L AW, CHINA AND 
THE FIVE PRINCIPLES
Scholarship on the topic of international law – what it is and how it 
works – continues to flourish, manifested by the growing body of 
literature in this field.53 Diverse views and concepts, attempting to 
grasp the changing nature of international law, constantly emerge – 
from a ‘relative normativity’54 to the ‘decay of international law’,55 
utopia,56 fairness,57 and the coexistence/cooperation didactic.58 
There is a growing literature examining the transformation of inter-
national law – the Eastphalian/Westphalian discourse,59 the experi-
ence from different regions and countries, such as China,60 and 
whether ‘authoritarian’ international law explains divergent State 
practice.61 Some commentators question whether international law 
is ‘international’ or even ‘law’.62 While it is impossible to examine 
here each of these various theories and conceptual approaches, this 
brief scan of the theoretical horizon reveals something fundamen-
tal: international law continues to evolve and is prolific with ongoing 
debate. It is an important context within which to explore trans-
boundary water cooperation and its applicable regulatory 
frameworks.
In this light, one legal scholar suggests that ‘[i]nternational law 
can be understood from an instrumentalist perspective’.63 Lowe 
identifies three limits of international law and asserts that ‘law can-
not provide an all-encompassing normative code for international 
society. It provides a language for international dealings, a concep-
tual and institutional framework … [it] is an instrument, a way of doing 
things, not a comprehensive code to govern international life’.64 This 
conceptual approach will be used to explore China’s ‘way of doing 
things’ through a brief survey of its attitude to international law, in 
the first instance, and then to examine how that might influence its 
transboundary water relations and practice.
There is a growing literature on China’s views towards international 
law.65 A prominent Chinese legal authority observes that ‘it is always 
important and necessary to study international law from the perspec-
tives of individual States in order to better appreciate how international 
law operates in each specific political, economic and social context. … 
history and culture become pertinent elements to international law’.66 
Clearly, China’s attitude towards international law (and international 
water law and practice)67 has been influenced by its history, geography 
and culture.68 This continues to shape the evolving nature of China’s 
international practice, described recently as ‘Chinese exceptionalism’.69
Only some 70 years ago, China as a ‘new nation’ was the first 
country to sign the UN Charter.70 Since then, as the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), it has embraced the broad principles set 
forth in the Charter and anchored its foreign policy on three basic 
pillars: equality, mutual benefit and respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of other nations.71 One of the most formi-
dable challenges that faced the ‘new China’ was the demarcation 
of its more than 22,000 kilometres long land boundary with 14 
States. When the PRC emerged, no single boundary was clearly 
demarcated, nor were they free of disputes with neighbouring 
countries. Some decades later, most (but not all) of these issues 
have been resolved through a series of bilateral agreements with 
the majority of its neighbours.72 Underpinning these actions, and 
as the continuing cornerstone of China’s foreign policy, the Five 
 53See, e.g., E Roucounas, A Landscape of Contemporary Theories of International Law (Brill 
2019).
 54P Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 413.
 55A Carty, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in 
International Affairs (Manchester University Press 1986); see also DW Kennedy, ‘The 
Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in 
International Affairs (Book Review)’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 
451.
 56M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press 2006).
 57TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 1998).
 58PM Dupuy, ‘International Law: Torn between Coexistence, Cooperation and 
Globalization: General Conclusion’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 278.
 59A Coleman and JN Maogoto, ‘“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: China in 
a Globalized World’, (2013) 3 Asian Journal of International Law 237; see also A Carty 
and F Nazir Lone, ‘Some New Haven International Law Reflections on China, India and 
their Various Territorial Disputes’ (2011) 19 Asia Pacific Law Review 93.
 60C Cai, The Rise of China and International Law Taking Chinese Exceptionalism Seriously, 
(Oxford University Press 2019) (Cai suggests that China’s approach to international law is 
more principle-based rather than rule-based); see also Chan (n 47) 100.
 61T Ginsburg, ‘Authoritarian International Law?’ (2020) 114 American Journal of 
International Law 221. Ginsburg introduces 'authoritarian international law’ – ‘defined as 
legal rhetoric, practices, and rules specifically designed to extend the survival and reach 
of authoritarian rule across space and/or time’ (ibid 228) – which is characterised by less 
use of formal third-party adjudication in favour of State-to-State negotiations, leading to 
‘the development of new norms and practices’ (ibid 225). See also S Chesterman, ‘Can 
International Law Survive a Rising China?’ (National University of Singapore 2020) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr act_id=3630876>.
 62A Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford University Press 2017).
 63V Lowe, ‘The Limits of the Law, Inaugural Lecture’ (2015) 379 Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law 1, 26 (emphasis added in main text). Lowe identifies 
three limitations of international law – its inability to address ‘intractable’ problems; its 
lack of specificity in dealing with particular issues; and the limits of its conceptual 
framework to cover certain issues.
 64ibid (emphasis added).
 65Early seminal works include T Wang, ‘International Law in China: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives’ (1990) 221 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 195; more recent scholarship includes, inter alia, Xue (n 27) and Cai (n 
60); see also A Zuo, ‘China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated International Law: A 
Historical Perspective from the Opium War to the South China Sea Arbitration Case’, 
(2018) 6 University of Baltimore Journal of International Law 21.
 66Xue (n 27) 53–54. See also M Jorgensen, ‘Equilibrium & Fragmentation in the 
International Rule of Law: The Rising Chinese Geolegal Order’ (2018) <https://publi shup.
uni-potsd am.de/files/ 42282/ kfg_wps21.pdf>.
 67Benvenisti (n 26) 274 (suggesting that ‘ancient Asian traditions can inform decision-
makers as to the management of specific treaty regimes as well as the evolution of 
international law in general’).
 68See generally MA Carrai, Sovereignty in China, A Genealogy of a Concept since 1840 
(Cambridge University Press 2019); J Pan, ‘Chinese Philosophy and International Law’ 
(2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 233.
 69Cai (n 60); Jorgensen (n 66) introduces the notion of ‘geolegal power’ to explain China’s 
approach to international law; see also Saul (n 27) 197–201.
 70UN, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–1947 (UN 1947) 33, para 15.
 71Xue (n 27) 63: ‘In its provisional constitutional document, the Common Program, it was 
provided that the People's Republic of China should establish its diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for 
territorial sovereignty, which was subsequently incorporated into the first Constitution 
of the country’ (footnote references omitted). Chan (n 47) 70 claims that China has 
followed these 3 principles since the Qing dynasty.
 72Xue (n 27) 82. See also Saul (n 27) 203.
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Principles of Peaceful Coexistence73 provide a blueprint for 
China’s actions: State sovereignty,74 within the paradigm of ‘peace-
ful co-existence’.75 According to Xue Hanqin (now a Judge at the 
International Court of Justice), ‘the ultimate goal China pursues is 
to achieve equitable and reasonable solutions; it is fully aware that 
only by so doing could the settlement last in the interest of peace 
and good neighbourliness’.76
The ‘Five Principles’ originated in separate statements endorsed 
by China with Myanmar and India, close to seven decades ago. 
Starting with the 1954 Agreement between China and India – the 
first treaty that formulated the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence77 – these principles have become integral to China’s ap-
proach to international law.78 The preamble of this Agreement spe-
cifically elaborates on these Five Principles, including: (i) mutual 
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mu-
tual non-aggression; (iii) mutual non-interference in the internal af-
fairs of the other party; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) 
peaceful coexistence.79 These elements, reiterated on numerous 
occasions in various UN fora and in China’s continued support for 
the UN, remain the principal underpinnings of China’s diplomacy.80 
This has been reinforced most recently by President Xi Jinping 
during his historic visit to Myanmar, referring to them as ‘a basic 
norm in international relations’.81
In China's view, the Five Principles find broad expression in the 
UN Charter,82 evidenced also in China’s support for the UN.83 In 
the transboundary water context, the formulation of Article 8 of 
the Watercourses Convention echoes the constituent elements of 
the Five Principles, calling on watercourse States to ‘cooperate on 
the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual ben-
efit in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of 
an international watercourse’.84 While this approach is reflected 
broadly in China’s transboundary water treaty practice, down-
stream riparian neighbours seek evidence of ‘mutual benefit’ across 
the basin.
Many of China’s international initiatives, such as its Belt and 
Road Initiative,85 appear to be in line with its adherence to the Five 
Principles.86 This is reflected also in China’s growing engagement 
in numerous multilateral,87 regional and bilateral regimes, and 
global and regional institutions, suggesting a more nuanced and 
evolving contemporary approach to State sovereignty in its prac-
tice.88 In the water-related context, China’s role in international 
environmental negotiations appears to be influenced by two key 
factors: its enormous population, and its massive developing 
economy, highlighting thus its focus on national imperatives.89
 73According to Xue (n 27) 107: ‘In its foreign policy statements it reiterates that in the 
twenty-first century, it will continue to maintain its foreign relations with all States on 
the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (footnote references omitted).
 74Carrai (n 68) 308 (noting the importance of sovereignty, enshrined in the Five 
Principles, which was considered by one of China’s leading legal scholars, Wang Tieya, 
and other scholars to comprise ‘the PRC’s greatest contribution to international law’).
 75Xue (n 27) 90: ‘China’s persistent stand on the primacy of State sovereignty has its 
deep roots embedded in the miserable experience in its modern history [footnote 
references omitted]’. Her discussion on sovereignty concludes by stating: ‘China reserves 
its position on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, because it believes 
that sovereignty, in the final analysis, is not so much about the concept itself, relevant or 
obsolete; it is a claim about the way in which how different political and social systems, 
different forms of civilization and culture should correlate and treat each other in 
international relations’ (ibid 88–107).
 76ibid 85.
 77Agreement between the PRC and the Republic of India on the Trade and Intercourse 
between the Tibet Region of China and India (adopted 29 April 1954, entered into force 
3 June 1954). Commemorating the recent anniversary of these engagements, China’s 
President Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to these principles; ‘Xi, Myanmar Leaders 
Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties’ (Xinhuanet, 18 January 2020); and ‘Carry 
forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World through 
Win-win Cooperation’ (People’s Daily Online, 10 July 2014).
 78Calling for a new international order based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, Premier Zhou and his counterparts from India and Myanmar proposed to 
adopt the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the norms governing international 
relations. See China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘China's Initiation of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-Existence’ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_66553 
9/3602_66554 3/3604_66554 7/t18053.shtml>.
 79Chan (n 47) 92 provides more details, explaining that the Five Principles were 
expanded by the 1955 Bandung Conference to ten guiding principles; see also discussion 
in Carrai (n 68) 307–318.
 80The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were incorporated in the Preamble of 
China’s Constitution (4 December 1982) preamble (English version available at <http://
www.unesco.org/educa tion/eduri ghts/media/ docs/39f67 5948a d50e4 af1f1 1188d aea47 
d593e 7f694.pdf>). In a more recent iteration, see President Xi Jinping’s first address to 
the United Nations General Assembly, ‘Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of 
Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ (28 
September 2015) <http://issi.org.pk/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2015/04/Doc-19.pdf>. The 
statement concludes urging ‘a new partnership of win-win cooperation and a community 
of shared future for mankind’ (ibid).
 81‘Xi, Myanmar Leaders Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties’ (n 77). See also D 
Roy, ‘“Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” Fails to Impress – or Reassure (The Diplomat, 2 
April 2020), emphasizing China’s view that international relations should have ‘Chinese 
characteristics’, based on the core principles espoused in the Five Principles.
 82UN Charter (n 46) art 2(1).
 83Z Wang and B Hu, ‘China’s Reform and Opening-up and International Law’ (2010) 9 
Chinese Journal of International Law 196.
 84Watercourses Convention (n 29) art 8. On the duty to cooperate, see generally C Leb, 
Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources (Oxford University Press 2013); 
C Leb, ‘One Step at a Time: International Law and the Duty to Cooperate in the 
Management of Shared Water Resources’ (2014) 40 Water International 21.
 85G Martinico and X Wu (eds), A Legal Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative. Towards a 
New Silk Road? (Palgrave Macmillan 2020).
 86China launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, a cornerstone of its good 
neighbour policy, aimed ‘to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future’. 
See Government of China, ‘China Unveils Action Plan on Belt and Road Initiative’ (28 
March 2015) <http://engli sh.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/03/28/conte nt_28147 
50790 55789.htm>.
 87Wang and Hu (n 83) 193. China is party to a number of water-related multilateral 
environmental agreements, such as the Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance (Ramsar Convention), the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1992 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification, to name a few; see J Lee, ‘The Governance of Wetland Ecosystems and 
the Promotion of Transboundary Water Cooperation – Opportunities Presented by the 
Ramsar Convention’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 70.
 88Chesterman (n 61) calls it a ‘kinder, gentler Westphalia’ referring to Ginsburg (footnote 
reference omitted). Saul (n 27) 211 finds that, ‘[o]n the whole, China takes international 
law seriously and views sovereign equality and multilateralism – including the protection 
of the weak from the strong – as positive social values’.
 89Xue (n 27) 152: ‘As the largest developing country, China has only about 7 per cent of 
the world's arable land, but it has to feed 20 per cent of the world population. Its per 
capita share of water resources is far below the world average. The natural conditions of 
a significant part of the country are unsuitable for agricultural and industrial 
development’.
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4 | REFRAMING THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION: AN 
INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACH
International law, by its very nature, is diverse, evolutionary and even 
reconciliatory.90 Normative paradigms can (and are) devised, inter-
preted and understood in dynamic ways, taking into account ‘the per-
spectives and principles of traditional systems, not merely in a general 
way, but with reference to specific principles, concepts and aspira-
tional standards’.91 In this context, normative principles emerge from a 
broad range of sources, including the society being governed.92 This 
contextualized approach to international law helps to explain varied 
national and regional approaches. China’s adherence to the Five 
Principles influences its attitude to international law; this principles-
based modus operandi, in turn, affects its transboundary water prac-
tice. Taking this into account, and drawing on Lowe’s ‘instrumentalist’ 
approach,93 two observations regarding China’s transboundary water 
practice can be made. Firstly, China’s approach to international law is 
largely principles-based, embedded within, and influenced by, a spe-
cific history, geography and culture.94 Secondly, from this perspective, 
the two UN water conventions can be viewed as ‘optional’ legal frame-
works, to be considered and applied within the particular regional con-
text.95 Thus, the legal discourse on transboundary water cooperation 
can be reframed such that a riparian nation’s ‘way of doing things’ pro-
vides an intrinsic context for understanding its transboundary water 
practice. This reframing exercise offers new insights and opportunities 
for devising more meaningful cooperation, especially with respect to 
China’s upstream dilemma. How might China’s approach to interna-
tional law be translated into enhanced transboundary water relations?
China’s international cooperation ‘carries forward’ the Five 
Principles in global policy forums,96 evidenced in a steadfast re-
peated mantra of idealistic aspirations – being the ‘good neighbour’, 
contributing to a ‘harmonious society’,97 and support for a ‘commu-
nity of interests’ with ‘win-win’ outcomes.98 The China-Russian 
Declaration on the Promotion of International Law, as one example, 
articulates this approach as follows:
The principles of international law are the cornerstone for 
just and equitable international relations featuring win-
win cooperation, creating a community of shared future 
for mankind, and establishing common space of equal and 
indivisible security and economic cooperation.99
Each of these high-level objectives provides ample opportuni-
ties for their more pragmatic implementation within the trans-
boundary water context, in line with China’s adherence to the Five 
Principles. Translating broad policy aims into effective transbound-
ary water cooperation requires innovative methods, albeit within 
regional settings. China’s practical actions under the ‘Red Lines’ 
water-related monitoring requirements set forth in its FYPs demon-
strate concrete steps to address water quality and quantity issues, 
affecting its transboundary water resources as well.100 At the inter-
national level, evaluating the effectiveness of China’s transbound-
ary cooperation is rather more difficult. McCracken’s recent study 
identifies various typologies of transboundary water cooperation 
and methods for assessing them; one of these is ‘outcome cooper-
ation’.101 Tarlock applies this notion in a legal context, suggesting 
 90Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) 
[1997] ICJ Rep 7, 90 (Separate Opinion by Judge Weeramantry): ‘The law necessarily 
contains within itself the principle of reconciliation’, in referring to the ‘"congruence of 
fit" between development and environmental imperatives’.
 91ibid 110.
 92Weil (n 54) 414, discussing the structural weaknesses of international law observes, 
‘the international normative system, given the specific structure of the society it is called 
on to govern, is less elaborate and more rudimentary than domestic legal orders’ 
(emphasis added). In the Chinese context, Chan (n 47) 61 asserts: ‘It is imperative for the 
legitimacy of international law to understand China’s relationship with international legal 
order in a normative framework that takes into account China’s national characteristics 
….’
 93Lowe (n 63) 20: ‘international law should be understood from an instrumentalist 
perspective. …. The Law is one way of doing things; and it has its own merits and its own 
limitations’.
 94Benvenisti (n 26) 273 (suggesting that ‘shared Asian traditions … can and should serve 
as guidance in the management of the region’s many shared resources’). See also Chan (n 
47) 290, who following his extensive study asserts that the ‘context of the historical, 
political, economic, social and cultural peculiarities and circumstances of a State’ must be 
considered as integral to China’s approach to international law.
 95Lowe (n 63) 22 (asserting ‘the Law is always an optional framework within which to 
operate’ (emphasis added)).
 96Only recently (January 2020), China’s President Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to 
these principles, agreeing to carry forward’ this approach (n 77). See also L Wang, ‘Xi 
Jinping’s Thought on Diplomacy and China’s Position in the New Era’ (China Today, 27 
June 2018) <http://www.china today.com.cn/cteng lish/2018/comme ntari es/20180 6/
t2018 0627_80013 3707.html>.
 97See Xi Jinping, first address to UNGA (n 80) where he shares a ‘new vision of seeking 
win-win outcomes for all’; see also Biba (n 42) 4–5 who summarizes as follows: ‘China’s 
foreign policy has also put a premium on its so-called “good-neighbourly policy” (mulin 
zhengce) as a part of the country’s peaceful rise (heping jueqi), later renamed peaceful 
development (heping fazhan), strategy that has itself been further supplemented by lofty 
slogans such building a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie) and a “community of common 
destiny” (mingyun gongtongti). … The key principle of China’s neighbourhood diplomacy is 
“becoming friends and partners with your neighbours” (yulin weishan, yilin weiban), which 
is itself aimed at “building an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighborhood” (mulin, 
anlin, fulin)’.
 98E Benvenisti and G Nolte (eds), Community Interests Across International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2018).
 99‘The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the 
Promotion of International Law’ (25 June 2016), cited in Benvenisti and Nolte, ibid, 6. 
Following a brief introductory survey on this topic, the authors conclude: ‘What is clear 
is that global challenges will continue to demand the attention of national communities 
and resolving them will continue to require a cooperative approach’ (ibid 7).
 100China’s 12th FYP (n 15) requires reporting across three ‘red lines’ related to water use, 
water use efficiency, and pollution, with limits on each of these set for 2015, 2020 and 
2030; for more details, see Global Water Partnership, ‘China’s Water Resources 
Management Challenge: The “Three Red Lines”’ (2015) (n 15); China’s 13th FYP (n 16) 
includes 25 targets, building on the water-related reporting, especially targeting 
pollution. For more details see China Water Risk, ‘China’s 13th Five-Year Plan for 
Ecological & Environmental Protection (2016-2020)’ <http://www.china water risk.org/
notic es/china s-13th-five-year-plan-2016-2020/>, which summarizes the 13th FYP’s six 
general aims for improving China’s water resources quality, and sets forth some of the 
more defined water-related targets in the plan, including the objective that more than 70 
percent of China’s surface water must reach Grade III or equivalent by 2020.
 101M McCracken, It Depends: Defining Cooperation and Evaluating Effectiveness in 
Transboundary Waters (PhD Dissertation, Oregon State University 2019). McCracken 
devises ‘the Four Frames of Cooperation and the Weighted Model of Effective Cooperation 
… to improve the understanding of cooperation and encourage a detailed evaluation of the 
quality, success, and effectiveness of cooperative processes’ (ibid 2). The ‘Four Frames of 
Cooperation’ comprise legal, institutional, relational and outcome (ibid 106). McCracken 
advocates that ‘effective cooperation is equitable and sustainable’ (ibid 184).
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that transboundary water cooperation could be improved by focus-
ing on measurable cooperation outputs.102 Identifying, agreeing 
and acting on shared ‘win-win’ outcomes could help to transform 
the quality of the cooperation.103 Tarlock elaborates:
Some benefits, such as shared hydropower revenues or firm 
water allocations, may be immediately measurable, but 
others, such as comprehensive ecosystem restoration plans, 
can only be measured over longer time frames. Ultimately, 
cooperation for cooperation’s sake does not advance water 
security and often perpetuates unilateral action.104
Translating China’s ‘community of interest’ and 'win-win' ob-
jectives into actual shared-benefits practice across their interna-
tional basins105 could improve its transboundary cooperation;106 
this would align with an approach already broadly endorsed in this 
field.107 A recent policy statement issued by China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reveals some positive movement in this direction: 
‘new projects in transboundary rivers must go through scientific 
planning and study, with the consideration of the interests of both 
downstream and upstream riparian countries’.108 This Chinese 
‘way of doing things’ can be traced in the evolving Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation in two important respects.109 In the first 
instance, the arrangement is based on soft law instruments, aris-
ing out of inter-state declarations (compared with the more formal 
international agreement on the Mekong signed up by the four 
lower riparians under the Mekong Agreement). Secondly, the LMC 
aims are based on broad aspirational principles. The LMC recently 
agreed a package of cooperative actions, with a priority given to 
improving people’s livelihoods across the region.110 Measurable 
outcome cooperation objectives aimed at addressing regional is-
sues, such as poverty alleviation, more reliable access to energy 
resources and environmental protection, could help to catalyse 
improved transboundary water cooperation.111 The LMC example 
of incremental regional cooperation could assist with implement-
ing a shared-benefits strategy more broadly, albeit within a soft 
principles-based approach.112
Despite this, hard questions remain on how ‘outcome cooper-
ation’ might be achieved in China’s transboundary water relations 
with its southern neighbours, where tough challenges remain.113 
Could China’s adherence to the Five Principles – ‘mutual respect 
for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’, ‘equality 
and mutual benefit’ and ‘peaceful coexistence’ – provide the im-
petus for more meaningful transboundary water cooperation 
across the region? Given the origins of these principles, stem-
ming from agreements with India and Myanmar, might this com-
monality provide a shared platform for improved transboundary 
water cooperation, and, perhaps catalyse a shared-benefits 
strategy on the Indus, or the Brahmaputra?114 China may have 
little incentive to moveforward without considerable pressure.115 
However, principles-based opportunities do exist across the re-
gion.116 As just one example, regional dependence on hydro-
power raises a spectrum of prospects, which could be linked to 
shared economic and environmental benefits.117 China’s princi-
ples-based approach resonates with a shared-benefits paradigm. 
It also raises issues linked with the legal notion of ‘shared 
 102Tarlock, ‘Toward a More Robust International Water Law’ (n 28) argues that shared 
approaches to beneficial outcomes could relieve water stress and enhance water across 
entire water basins.
 103AD Tarlock, ‘Promoting Effective Water Management Cooperation among Riparian 
Nations’ (Global Water Partnership 2015).
 104Tarlock, ‘Toward a More Robust International Water Law’ (n 28) 289.
 105As one example of growing cooperation on the Mekong see S Lee, ‘Benefit Sharing in 
The Mekong River Basin’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 307.
 106O McIntyre, ‘Benefit-sharing and Upstream/Downstream Cooperation for Ecological 
Protection of Transboundary Waters: Opportunities for China as an Upstream State’ 
(2015) 40 Water International 48. See also Tarlock, ‘Four Challenges’ (n 28) 403.
 107See summary discussion of ‘community of interests’ in O McIntyre, ‘Transboundary 
Water Resources’ in A Nollkaemper and I Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared 
Responsibility in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 905, 910–911.
 108McIntyre (n 106) 67.
 109The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation states that its key aims are to: bolster the 
economic and social development of the Sub-regional countries, enhance the wellbeing 
of their people, narrow the development gap among regional countries, support the 
ASEAN Community building, to promote the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, and, to advance South-South cooperation; see <http://www.
lmcch ina.org/eng/gylmhz_1/jj/t1519 110.htm>.
 110Following the most recent LMC meeting in February 2020 in Laos, China’s foreign 
Minister Wang Yi outlined the following agreed areas of enhanced cooperation: 
connectivity in trade, combating the coronavirus epidemic, dealing with drought across the 
region, promote the upgrading of agricultural cooperation, enhancing people’s sense of 
fulfilment, jointly maintaining peace and stability in the subregion. The six countries 
agreed to strengthen exchanges in governance, and to cooperate in dealing with security 
challenges across the region; ‘Wang Yi Elaborates on Priorities of Future Lancang-Mekong 
Cooperation’ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_66280 5/t1748 369.shtml>.
 111McIntyre (n 106) 67.
 112AD Tarlock and P Wouters, ‘Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable 
Apportionment?’ (2007) 18 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy 523.
 113Y Feng, W Wang and J Liu, ‘Dilemmas in and Pathways to Transboundary Water 
Cooperation between China and India on the Yaluzangbu-Brahmaputra River’ (2019) 11 
Water 2096; see also ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds a Briefing for Chinese and 
Foreign Media on President Xi Jinping's Attendance at the Second Informal Meeting 
between Leaders of China and India in India and His State Visit to Nepal’ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 9 October 2019) <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_66280 5/
t1707 022.shtml>.
 114China continues to develop major dams on the Indus and Brahmaputra and has yet to 
conclude any transboundary water agreements with its downstream riparian neighbours 
on these shared freshwaters, apart from some data-sharing agreements with India. Can 
shared hydropower projects offer shared opportunities in this regard? See L Yang, 
‘Transboundary Water Cooperation on The Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra – A Legal 
Analysis of Riparian State Practice’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 286. Yang explores two models 
for possible enhanced cooperation, including an integrated hydropower approach, and 
through shared commitments under multilateral environmental agreements that 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and India are already party, such as the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity.
 115McIntyre (n 106) 67.
 116BO Magsig, ‘Water Security in Himalayan Asia: First Stirrings of Regional 
Cooperation?’ in Wouters et al (n 1) 274.
 117Tarlock, ‘Four Challenges’ (n 28) 397 cautions against the rush to dam and divert, 
arguing these should be developed cooperatively, with a view to sharing benefits across 
the basin ‘to ensure that all riparian states receive a measure of water justice’.
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responsibility’ in international law, a topic particularly relevant to 
transboundary water regimes.118
China’s ‘outcome cooperation’ on its transboundary waters 
could be devised through various means, such as ‘relational con-
tracts,119 a communicative approach120 and through technical 
joint institutions and regional organizations.121 Each of these 
methods accord with China’s principles-based approach to inter-
national law, where regional bilateral relationships continue to be 
central to transboundary water cooperation. This involves con-
sultations to find flexible arrangements, avoiding specific allot-
ments of water shares in favour of adaptive processes and 
institutional interactions, which aligns with best practice in this 
field.122 Institutions ‘can bridge the inherent gap between sover-
eigns, and lower the transaction costs involved in communica-
tion, the monitoring of performance and the enforcement of 
rules, by creating a suitable political environment for transac-
tions between their members’.123 Under this approach, national 
sovereignty is preserved and yet softened, falling within the hall-
marks of the Five Principles and consistent with China’s ‘way of 
doing things’.124 The LMC framework demonstrates how this 
could be achieved at the basin level. At the global level, trans-
boundary water cooperation could find further support from 
China’s engagement with the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).125
Finally and on a slightly different note, could this transboundary 
water practice be viewed as ‘special custom’?126 While not within the 
purview of this article, a closer examination of whether the Five 
Principles might comprise special or particular custom127 could offer 
new insights into regional transboundary water practice. In his review 
of special custom, D’Amato calls for ‘new methods in the social sci-
ences’ to permit a systematic analysis of diplomatic correspondence 
among nations, and other means to explore more completely the no-
tion of regional custom. Barberis explored this topic within the Latin 
American context, developing a methodology for analysing the con-
cepts of ‘region’, and ‘regional legal standard’.128 China continues to 
apply the Five Principles – a ‘norm in international relations’129 – in its 
relations with its neighbours and has done so for close to seven de-
cades.130 Given the regional origins of the principles, in legal agree-
ments with India and Myanmar, and the consistency of China’s 
application, the notion of special custom could be explored 
further.131
5  | CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As international law and international relations continue to trans-
form, traditional approaches to evaluating transboundary water 
cooperation must also be recalibrated. International diplomacy in 
a mutable world also needs to evolve to meet diverse challenges, 
new and old.132 Finding pragmatic ways to coexist in uncertain 
and changing circumstances will continue to confront nation 
States around the globe.133 Balancing regional and global commu-
 118A Nollkaemper and I Plakokefalos, ‘The Practice of Shared Responsibility: A 
Framework for Analysis’ in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (n 107) 1. See also O McIntyre 
(n 107) 905 (discussing the notions of ‘cooperative responsibility’ and ‘cumulative 
responsibility’, both relevant in transboundary water situations).
 119Benvenisti (n 36) 410 defines these as ‘international agreements for the joint 
management of shared freshwater, especially those including the construction of specific 
water-related projects such as dams, hydroelectric facilities and irrigation works’. This 
joint management, project-focused approach aligns with Tarlock’s outcome cooperation.
 120Y Su, ‘Evolving Normativity in Contemporary International Water Law: A 
Communicative Approach to the Growing Role of Non-State Actors’ (on file with 
authors).
 121Benvenisti (n 36) 412 identifies some of the benefits of joint institutions.
 122Lowe (n 63) 27: ‘The law can impose a duty to adopt identified, practical solutions that 
are already available to States; but the lawyers are well advised to walk a pace or two 
behind the scientists and technical experts who alone can make potential solutions into 
realizable practical aims, and appropriate subjects for legal obligations’. In the 
transboundary water context, see discussion on adaptive management in Tarlock, ‘Four 
Challenges’ (n 28) 384.
 123Benvenisti (n 36) 412 suggests that international institutions could offset some of the 
factors that hinder cooperation. Chesterman reviews Asia’s ‘under-participation and 
under-representation’ in international institutions; see S Chesterman, ‘Asia’s 
Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures’ (2016) 
27 European Journal of International Law 945.
 124See more details in Carrai (n 68) 23–33.
 125BM Kuhn, ‘China’s Commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals: An Analysis of 
Push and Pull Factors and Implementation Challenges’ (2018) 3 Chinese Political Science 
Review 359. China has largely internalised the SDGs. The National Plan on Implementation 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is the key policy document for guiding 
China’s commitment to SDG implementation; see also A Rieu-Clarke, ‘Can Reporting 
Enhance Transboundary Water Cooperation? Early Insights from the Water Convention 
and the Sustainable Development Goals Reporting Exercise’ (2020) 29 Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law; H Hussein et al, ‘Monitoring 
Transboundary Water Cooperation in SDG 6.5.2: How a Critical Hydropolitics Approach 
Can Spot Inequitable Outcomes’ (2018) 10 Sustainability 3640.
 126A D’Amato, ‘The Concept of Special Custom in International Law’ (1969) 63 American 
Journal of International Law 211; see UN ‘Report of the International Law Commission 
Seventieth Session’ UN Doc A/73/10 (2018) 155, citing the cases of special custom, most 
of which involve water-related issues.
 127UN ‘Report of the International Law Commission Seventieth Session’ (n 126) 122. This 
report explores the methodology for identifying rules of customary international law and 
seeks to ‘offer practical guidance on how the existence of rules of customary 
international law, and their content, are to be determined’. It finds that (i) a rule of 
particular customary international law, whether regional, local or other, is a rule of 
customary international law that applies only among a limited number of States; and (ii) 
to determine the existence and content of a rule of particular customary international 
law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice among the States 
concerned that is accepted by them as law (opinio juris) among themselves (ibid 
154–156).
 128JA Barberis, ‘Les Règles Spécifiques du Droit International en Amérique Latine’ (1992) 
235 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 81.
 129‘Xi, Myanmar Leaders Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties’ (n 77). See also 
discussion in Carrai (n 68 and n 74).
 130Carrai (n 68) 435.
 131In this light, Jorgensen (66) 31 characterizes China’s regional approach to international 
law as a new ‘geolegal power’ with ‘shifting foundations in the regional legal order’.
 132‘How International Law Is Being Reshaped and the Challenges It Faces’ (World 
Economic Forum, 25 July 2018). See also Ginsburg (n 61) who traces the emergence and 
practice of authoritarian international law.
 133A Ward (ed), Risks and Opportunities in International Affairs (Chatham House 2018).
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nity interests in a system that protects self-interest is a systemic 
issue posing complex problems across the horizon of international 
law.134
Reframing the approach to understanding transboundary 
water cooperation within the broader context of international 
law and in the light of regional practice can help to identify new 
pathways for improved riparian nations' engagement. In the case 
study undertaken here, reframing China’s transboundary water 
practice means acknowledging the Five Principles as the leitmotif 
for its regional transboundary water cooperation; it is the im-
mutable foundation for its ‘way of doing things’.135 Outcome co-
operation, implemented through the more nuanced concept of 
contextualized international law, infused with the principle of 
‘peaceful co-existence’, offers meaningful insights into China’s 
transboundary water practice. Challenges remain in transform-
ing high-level rhetoric into meaningful action on the ground. 
Reframing the transboundary water legal discourse offers new 
opportunities for better understanding regional freshwater co-
operation – so essential for tackling ever-evolving environmen-
tal, economic and social challenges across the region and the 
globe.
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